THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National	Inte	llicence	Officers

	NFAC #6765-81/1 27 October 1981	
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	
	National Intelligence Officer for Warning	
FROM :	L. Gray Cowan National Intelligence Officer for Africa	
SUBJECT :	Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa	25X1
1. Action Reinformation.	equested: None; the attached report is for your	25X1
20 October 1981 w been coordinated w them. If they fea	nd: Community representatives and specialists met on ith the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not with the other participants, but is being circulated to el their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have ional concerns, I'll report further to you. L. Gray Cowan	25X1
Attachment NFAC #6765-81		
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DRV CL BY 084573 REVW ON 27 OCT 1991 DRV FM B9d(4.1)

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WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 36

MOZAMBIQUE

Analysts felt that Machel's government is feeling the pressure of NRM activities more than at any time in the past. The activities of the NRM are demoralizing the Mozambican military. This has resulted in Machel's call for additional Cuban support and does not preclude Zimbabwean involvement in support of Machel against the NRM. The increasing strain on Machel's government might ultimately lead to a move in the military against him.

ANGOLA

Analysts urged that a close watch be kept on any build-up of Cuban or other Soviet surrogates over the next three months. The Angolans appear to be looking for additional support from other than traditional sources and for financial support from Libya. Increased Cuban and other support in both Mozambique and Angola will further alarm Pretoria and may provoke additional South African action either in Angola or Mozambique.

SUDAN

A close watch has to be kept on the Sudanese internal situation over the next three months, particularly with reference to any developments in plotting against Nimeiri by Libya, possibly aided by Mengistu. Nimeiri's position ultimately rests on the support of the military; there are no indications that the military's loyalty to Nimeiri has diminished. Analysts were in general agreement that Libya was not in a position to mount a frontal attack on the western Sudan from Chad. If the Saudis make good on their pledge of \$150 million to Nimeiri, the funds should help the Sudanese cope more effectively with the country's serious economic plight.

BENIN

Recent reports indicate that a threat to Niger from Libyan-trained guerrillas based in Benin is developing. There also appears to be small groups of Libyan-trained dissidents from several other West African countries gathering in Benin, although we do not yet know their intentions. 25X1

SECRET

^{*}This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

MADAGASCAR

the use of Diego Suarez. The possibility exists that Ratsiraka might open Diego Suarez as a port to all nations which would permit greater Soviet opportunity to use the port.	for 25X1
SOMAL IA	
A watch should be kept over the next three months on any developments coup plotting against Siad from within the army. Terrorist activities triggered by Operation Bright Star 82 could continue after the end of the operation.	in 25X1
ZIMBABWE	
Analysts noted the growth of a clearly repressive tone to the Zimbabwe government and a greater emphasis on the one-party state in Mugabe's speech although it has not yet reached a critical stage. Increased labor unrest a rising white migration, however, indicate a growing element of instability within Zimbabwe that could lead to a destabilization of the Mugabe regime.	es, nd

